Game Signaling

This app helps you analyze Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in a class of Sender-Receiver (signaling) games with incomplete information.

In these games first Nature picks the Sender\'s type, from a set of two types, according to commonly-known prior probabilities. The Sender observes his type and chooses either (say) "left" or "right". The Receiver does not observe the Sender\'s type, only his action, and chooses a binary response. Payoffs depend on the entire history of the game. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and its refinements (e.g., the Intuitive Criterion) are commonly-used solution concepts in this environment.

Incomplete information Sender-Receiver games are widely used in economics (e.g., Spencian signaling models). The app comes with over a dozen different pre-set games, all with the same game tree but with various priors and payoffs, and consequently various sets of equilibria - ranging from a unique PBE obtained by iterated strict dominance to multiple equilibria (pooling, separating, or hybrid), satisfying or not the Intuitive Criterion. You may also choose a game with random payoffs, and edit both the payoffs and the prior to make up and analyze your own game.

The app helps you verify whether an assessment (which means a strategy profile and corresponding beliefs) form a PBE, or even a PBE satisfying the Intuitive Criterion. It is not a solver, but a tool for (guided) individual learning and discovery.

For more detail on how to use the app please click the "Help" button in the top-right corner. Send comments or interesting games for inclusion in future updates to peter.eso@economics.ox.ac.uk.

Peter Erno Eso